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The	goal	was	to	produce	research	that	could	shape	debate	on	the	 future	of	youth	work	 intervention	to	support	 the	Tackling	Paramilitarism	
programme.	The	chosen	method	was	to	review	literature	on	best	practice	across	a	number	of	international	models	of	intervention	with	young	
people	affected	by	violence	by	armed	groups	of	various	sorts,	and	to	conduct	field	research	in	Northern	Ireland.	Having	analysed	the	results,	










from	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 short-,	 medium-	 and	 long-term	 effects	 ranging	 from	 repeated	 victimization	 to	 psychological	 trauma,	
identity-based	discrimination	and	social	and	economic	exclusion	(United	Nations	General	Assembly	Security	Council,	2018:	5).	
The	UN	also	acknowledged	that	while	young	people	account	for	the	majority	of	those	engaged	in	extremist	violence,	only	a	‘minute	proportion’	





The	 political	 urgency	 for	 Governments	 to	 respond	 to	 the	 threat	 of	 global	 terrorism	 has	 contributed	 to	 a	 discourse	 in	which	
sweeping	 characterisations	 of	 youth	 as	 fundamentally	 at	 risk	 of	 ‘violent	 extremism’	 have	 produced	 unnuanced,	 counter-









Youth	 work	 necessarily	 starts	 from	 this	 perspective	 in	 its	 engagement	 with	 violent	 extremism.	 In	 principle,	 all	 youth	 work	 in	 the	 area	 of	
peacebuilding	is	guided	by	UN	Security	Council	Resolution	2250	on	Youth,	Peace	and	Security	(December	2015),	which	commits	all	signatories,	
including	the	UK,	to	youth	participation	 in	decision-making	processes,	the	protection	of	young	people’s	 lives	and	human	rights,	promoting	a	






as	 young	 people’s	 involvement	 with	 paramilitarism	 without	 reframing	 that	 contribution	 within	 a	 commitment	 to	 the	 well-being	 of	 young	
people.	 In	other	words,	the	problem	is	the	challenge	of	violence,	which	must	be	addressed	through	all	means	necessary	rather	than	 ‘young	
people’.	This	is	not	a	question	of	co-opting	youth	work	to	security,	but	of	achieving	security	for	all	through	youth	work	methods.	
This	 change	 in	 perspective	 raises	 a	 number	 of	 critical	 questions,	 which	 frame	 this	 research	 report	 into	 youth	 work	 practice	 to	 reduce	





organised	 violence	 and	 crime.	 The	 persistence	 of	 this	 circumstance	 some	 20	 years	 after	 a	 formal	 peace	 agreement	 (the	 1998	 Belfast	
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‘young	people’	 (15–29).	However,	 there	was	a	degree	of	political	 toleration	across	 the	whole	community	 for	violence	exercised	 for	political	
purposes,	and	the	definition	of	such	violence	as	either	‘criminal’	or	‘extreme’	was	contested.	
By	 1998,	 it	 was	 acknowledged	 by	 the	 governments	 of	 both	 the	 UK	 and	 Ireland	 that	 violence	 could	 not	 be	 eliminated	 by	 counter-security	
measures	 alone.	 Instead,	 the	 governments	 sponsored	 a	 comprehensive	 political	 approach,	 which	 bore	 fruit	 in	 the	 Belfast	 (Good	 Friday)	
Agreement	of	1998.	The	Agreement	directly	addressed	the	question	of	violence	and	organisational	continuity,	explicitly	denying	any	further	
formal	 or	 informal	 political	 legitimacy	 for	 violence	 and	 committing	 all	 signatories	 to	 ‘explicitly	 peaceful	 and	 democratic	 means’	 for	 the	
resolution	 of	 disputes.	 In	 addition,	 the	 Agreement	 established	 an	 international	 process	 for	 the	 disarmament	 and	 disbandment	 of	 all	
paramilitary	groups	and	for	the	early	release	of	prisoners	eschewing	political	violence.	
In	practice,	this	has	turned	out	to	be	a	politically	and	practically	fraught,	contentious	and	difficult	task.	The	Agreement	itself	was	not	universally	






(dissident	 republicans)	 continued	 to	 claim	 legitimacy	 to	 attack	police	officers,	 and	other	 security	 personnel	 remained	under	 explicit	 threat.	
Among	 loyalists,	 there	was	 ongoing	 evidence	 of	 recruitment,	 local	 activity	 and	 participation	 in	 intimidation,	 rioting	 and	 other	 public	 order	
activities.	 Instability	 in	 the	 power-sharing	 Executive	 resulted	 in	 many	 periods	 of	 uncertainty	 and	 tension,	 requiring	 inter-party	 talks	 and	
intervention	from	the	governments	of	the	UK	and	Ireland.	Added	to	this,	organisations	have	continued	to	have	alleged	involvement	in	criminal	






of	 the	 Northern	 Ireland	 political	 system	 in	 January	 2017.	 The	 risks	 for	 and	 by	 young	 people	were	 included	 as	 one	 of	 42	measures	 of	 the	
programme.	Under	Measure	A4,	 the	Education	Authority	placed	an	Outreach	Worker	 in	each	of	 the	eight	most	vulnerable	 ‘Communities	 in	
Transition’	across	Northern	Ireland,	with	a	view	to	preventing	young	people	from	joining	paramilitary	organisations.	According	to	the	Executive	
Action	 Plan	 that	 accompanied	 the	 programme:	 ‘The	Outreach	Workers	 aim	 to	 build	 relationships	with	 young	people	who	do	not	 currently	
engage	 with	 the	 youth	 services	 and	 who	 could	 be	 considered	 as	 being	 at	 higher	 risk	 of	 involvement	 in	 paramilitary	 activity;	 they	 deliver	
programmes	and	support	that	develop	the	young	people’s	resilience	and	awareness	of	risk	factors.’	




















also	 identifying	 the	 core	 elements	 of	 good	 practice.	 The	 work	 was	 divided	 into	 two	 parts:	 a	 desk-based	 review	 of	 a	 number	 of	 relevant	






literature	 review	 that	 documented	 13	 international	 examples	 of	 youth	 work	 designed	 to	 reduce	 the	 impact	 of	 violence	 on	 young	 people	
involved	with	armed	groups,	impacted	by	armed	groups	or	potentially	attracted	to	armed	groups.	
The	 second	 phase	 involved	 the	 completion	 of	 16	 semi-structured	 interviews	 and	 two	 focus	 groups.	 Interviewees	 were	 identified	 for	 their	
expertise	 in	working	with	young	people	at	 risk	 from	 involvement	 in	paramilitarism	 in	Northern	 Ireland.	 In	each	case,	 the	 respondents	were	
asked	to	reflect	on	the	current	landscape	and	the	future	risks	to	the	security	of	Northern	Ireland.	
For	 reasons	 of	 confidentiality,	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 to	 identify	 the	 participants;	 however,	 the	 interviewees	 included	 youth	 workers	 directly	





























































Criminologists	began	considering	both	the	social	 significance	of	youth	 ‘gangs’	 to	 their	members	as	well	as	the	criminal	activities	with	which	
they	may	be	engaged	(ibid.).	 ‘Gangs’	were	increasingly	associated	with	territory,	crime	and	violence	(Densley,	2013).	In	this	vein,	and	after	a	
wide-ranging	 consultation	 with	 youth	 and	 community	 workers,	 police,	 criminal	 justice	 agency	 representatives	 and	 young	 ‘gang’	 members	
themselves,	Miller	(1975:	121)	defined	a	‘gang’	as:	
A	 self-formed	 association	 of	 peers,	 bound	 together	 by	mutual	 interests,	 with	 identifiable	 leadership,	 well-developed	 lines	 of	

















In	 such	 contexts,	 ‘gangs’	 may	 come	 to	 constitute	 an	 alternative	 form	 of	 social	 order	 to	 the	 police	 and	 the	 state.	 It	 is	 therefore	 perhaps	
unsurprising	 that	 under	 these	 conditions,	 ‘gang’	 members	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 involved	 in	 serious	 and	 violent	 ‘delinquency’	 than	 non-
members	 (Thornberry	 et	 al.,	 2003;	 Bennett	 and	 Holloway,	 2004).	 Yet,	 the	 evidence	 would	 suggest	 that	 the	 links	 between	 membership,	
criminality	 and	 violence	 are	 complex,	 with	 identities	 for	 young	members	 shifting	 in	 differing	 contexts	 between	 ‘gang	member’/’non-gang	
member’	and	conventional/criminal	activity	(Medina	et	al.,	2013;	Weaver,	2015).	
While	it	is	clear	that	‘gangs’	exist	across	differing	countries	and	contexts,	what	is	not	clear	is	the	actual	extent	or	scale	of	the	‘problem’	and	how	




Manchester	Police	 suggested	 there	were	more	 than	60	 street	gangs	 in	Manchester,	with	almost	900	members	 (House	of	Commons,	2015).	
Outdated	records	and	limited	intelligence	on	the	internal	structure	of	‘gangs’	(Katz,	2003),	and	at	times	the	‘racial	profiling’	of	non-affiliated	

































US	 has	 tended	 to	 focus	 on	 prevention,	 intervention	 (including	 street	 and	 outreach	 work)	 and	 suppression	 (Fraser,	 2017)	 –	 the	 use	 of	
suppression	and	policing	tactics	–	have	been	increasingly	prevalent	(ibid.).	
However,	 alternative	 models	 of	 dealing	 with	 youth	 ‘gang’	 violence	 have	 developed,	 even	 within	 the	 US	 context.	 One	 such	 model	 is	 the	
Cincinnati	 Initiative	 to	 Reduce	 Violence	 (CIRV),13	 which	 is	 a	 violence-reduction	 and	 problem-orientated	 policing	 approach	 to	 ‘gangs’	 that	
prioritises	partnership	and	multi-agency	working	alongside	deterrence	strategies	that	focus	on	a	small	number	of	young	people	most	actively	
involved	in	‘gangs’.	Such	approaches	are	often	based	upon	‘the	call	in’,	whereby	young	‘gang’	members	are	asked	to	attend	a	public	meeting	
and	 sign	 a	 ‘no	 violence’	 contract/pledge,	 which	 then	 allows	 them	 to	 access	 various	 health,	 social,	 educational	 and	 employment	 support	
services	and	resources	–	providing	they	‘hold	up	their	end	of	the	bargain’	(Fraser,	2017).	Such	an	approach	frames	violence	as	a	‘public	health	




































political	or	 religious	agenda	 (Kundani,	 2012).14	 Irish	psychologist	 John	Horgan	 (2012)	has	 suggested	 that	 the	 shift	 away	 from	 focusing	upon	
‘terrorism’	towards	‘radicalisation’	was	as	a	result	of	the	inability	to	produce	a	coherent	psycho-pathological	profile	of	the	‘terrorist’	(ibid.).	This	
led,	 instead,	 to	 a	 switch	 from	 analysing	 being	 a	 ‘terrorist’	 to	 how	 someone	 becomes	 one,	 in	 other	 words,	 how	 an	 individual	 becomes	
‘radicalised’	(Horgan,	2008).	This	 included	a	move	away	from	focusing	upon	‘acts	of	terror’	themselves	to	the	thoughts	and	 ideas	that	could	
lead	to	violence	(Hörnqvist	and	Flyghed,	2012).	
Most	conceptualisations	of	 ‘radicalisation’	suggest	that	 it	 is	 ‘a	process	of	social	and	psychological	change,	which	 in	some	cases,	can	precede	
involvement	 in	 terrorism’	 (Braddock	 and	 Horgan,	 2016:	 385).	 This	 ‘process’	 definition	was	 adopted	 by	 the	 UK	 government	 and	 used	 in	 its	
definition	 of	 ‘radicalisation’.	 The	 June	 2011	 CONTEST	 counter-terrorism	 strategy	 (updated	 to	 its	 fourth	 edition	 in	 June	 2018)15	 states	 that	
‘Radicalisation	 refers	 to	 the	 process	 by	 which	 a	 person	 comes	 to	 support	 terrorism	 and	 forms	 of	 extremism	 leading	 to	 terrorism’	 (HM	






















is	upon	the	 ‘pathway’	analogy	of	 ‘radicalisation’	as	a	process	and	 the	aim	 is	 to	stop	 ‘terrorism’,	based	on	a	 ‘warped’	 ideology	or	worldview,	
before	it	occurs	(Heath-Kelly,	2017):	
The	 stated	 objective	 of	 the	 counter-radicalisation	 assemblage	 is	 to	 anticipate	 threat	 and	 enable	 intervention	 at	 the	 earliest	
possible	 stage.	 In	 particular,	 the	 knowledge	 practices	 that	 cast	 radicalisation	 as	 a	 social	 process	 or	 continuum	 suggest	 the	
possibility	of	early	identification	and	intervention	in	the	lifeworlds	of	potential	future	radicals	(De	Goede	and	Simon,	2013:	317).	
The	focus	on	Islamic	extremism,	and	on	Muslim	young	people	in	particular,	within	the	Prevent	strand	has	led	to	accusations	that	the	policy	is	
creating	a	new	‘suspect	community’	 in	the	UK	that	has	been	disproportionately	 impacted	upon	by	‘racial	profiling’,	 in	a	policing	and	security	
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context	 (Hillyard,	 1993;	 Hickman	 et	 al.,	 2012;	 Choudhury,	 2017).	 As	 part	 of	 the	 pre-emptive	 ‘counter-radicalisation’	 efforts	 in	 the	 UK,	 the	
CHANNEL	programme	was	established	 in	2007	to	provide	targeted	 interventions	(including	mentoring)	for	those	 ‘vulnerable’	 individuals	who	
are	displaying	signs	of	being	‘radicalised’	(Sukarieh	and	Tannock,	2015:	25).	The	very	young	age	at	which	some	young	people	are	referred	to	the	













59).	 Therefore,	 a	 high	 proportion	 of	 individuals	 identified	 by	 CHANNEL	 was	 below	 the	 age	 of	 16	 years,	 with	 some	 being	 under	 12	 years.	 Ultimately,	 the	 CHANNEL	













Despite	 numerous	 criticisms,	 the	 UK	 counter-terrorism	 strategy	 has	 been	 very	 influential	 in	 the	 development	 of	 similar	 strategies	 in	 other	
countries	 (such	as	the	US,	which	 launched	a	 ‘Countering	Violent	Extremism’	strategy	 in	2011;	see	Klausen	et	al.,	2016).	The	BRAVE	(Building	
Resilience	 Against	 Violent	 Extremism)	 model	 of	 ‘counter-radicalisation’	 in	 the	 US	 promotes	 the	 ‘public	 health’	 approach	 to	 ‘risk’	 and	
‘vulnerability’	 (referred	 to	 previously	 in	 relation	 to	 ‘gangs’),	 which	 focuses	 upon	 building	 ‘resilience’	 to	 ‘radicalisation’,	 in	 particular	 by	





focus	on	the	violent	 ideology/ideas	of	 the	 individual	–	engagement	with	young	people	 in	both	a	 ‘gangs’	and	a	 ‘terrorism’	context	ultimately	




19	Coppock	and	McGovern	 (2014:	249)	note	 in	 relation	 to	a	 guide	produced	 for	 the	Department	of	 Education	 in	England:	 ‘In	 Learning	Together	 to	Be	 Safe:	A	 toolkit	 to	

















































STREET	 undertook	 a	 detailed	 risk-
assessment	 of	 a	 person’s	 background	
and	 potential	 ‘vulnerabilities’.	 STREET	




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Unlike	 the	 CIRV	 model,	 participants	 did	
not	have	to	consent	 to	participation	but	
were	 selected	 after	 proposal	 by	 the	
Gardai	 (ACER3)	 or	 Probation	 Board	
(Change	 Works)	 or	 all	 three	 partner	
agencies	 (STRIVE)	 and	 encouraged	 to	
‘buy	in’	to	each	pilot	programme.	Within	
the	STRIVE	pilot	in	particular,	community	
agencies	 played	 an	 important	 role	




























































As	 the	 general	 recidivism	 rate	 in	 the	
Republic	 of	 Ireland	 in	 2018	 was	
estimated	at	58%	(JARC,	2018:	29),	the	






• No	 randomised	 control	 group	
used	for	comparative	purposes;	
• Difficulties	 in	 comparing	 across	
the	three	pilots;	
• Small	sample	sizes	(only	around	
90	 individuals	 were	 involved	























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































STREET	 	 	 Islamist	
youth	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Personal	
development	
CHANNEL	 	 	 Radical-	
isation	




AASHA	 	 	 Islamist	
youth	






EXIT	 	 	 Far-right	
extremism	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Support	for	
friends	and	
families	
MECHELEN	 	 	 Segregation	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 New	
narrative	for	
the	city	
CIRV	 	 	 Knife	crime	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Enforcement	
Training	of	
trainers	
FFP	 	 PD	 Youth	at	risk	
of	crime	





ST	GILES	 	 PD	 Young	
people	and	
gangs	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 County	lines	
project	
J-ARC	 	 	 Young	
violent	
offenders	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Drug	
treatment	
ROCA	 	 PD	 Less	jail,	
more	
future	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Relentless	
outreach	
	
GREAT	 	 	 Young	
people	and	
gangs	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Curricular-
based	
approach	
BUILD	 	 PD	 At-risk	
youth	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Peace	
League	
HOMEBOY	 	 	 People	in	
gangs	




















embedded	 and	widely	 accepted	 ethnic	 and	 political	 narrative	 of	 hostility	 and	 aspiration,	where	 armed	 violence	 has	 at	 various	 times	 been	
regarded	as	a	legitimate	tool	or	is	tolerated	as	a	fact	of	life	by	a	high	proportion	of	the	surrounding	communityin	some	areas.	The	longevity	of	
conflict	in	Northern	Ireland	since	1970	meant	that	armed	and	paramilitary	groups	became	an	integral	part	of	the	fabric	of	life	of	many	localities	
for	 decades.	 Over	 time,	 paramilitary	 organisations	 and	 paramilitaries	 were	 a	 critical	 part	 of	 the	 internal	 community	 structure	 and	 the	
organisation	 of	 community	 life,	 embedded	 in	 families,	 cultural	 tradition,	 social	 control,	 the	 local	 economy	 and	 community	 development.	





integral	 to	 community	 and	 spatial	 identity,	 reflected	 in	 public	 visual	 culture,	 annual	 celebration	 and	 historical	 remembering	 of	 events.	 In	





yet	been	possible	 to	assume	what	CIRV	 calls	 the	 ‘moral	 voice	of	 the	 community’	with	 full	 effect,	 especially	 at	 local	 level.	 Is	 	 action	against	
paramilitary	and	armed	groups	by	the	state	in	2020	to	be	understood	as	an	essential	and	positive	action	to	uphold	the	rule	of	law	or	a	heavy-
handed	external	attack	on	communities	by	their	foes.	In	the	event	of	confrontation,	who	will	be	considered	‘us’	and	who	is	‘them’?		Tackling	




Uncertainty	 about	 political,	 administrative	 or	 community	 support	 in	 ‘tackling	 paramilitarism’	 continues	 to	 mean	 that	 actively	 pursuing	
paramilitaries	 and	 paramilitarism	 is	 treated	 as	 an	 unacceptable	 personal	 or	 organisational	 risk	 by	 many	 state	 and	 voluntary	 agencies,and	
avoided.	 	 As	 a	 result,	 practice	 in	 relation	 to	 paramilitarism	 and	 armed	 groups	 in	 Northern	 Ireland	 remains	 informal	 and	 dependent	 on	
individuals	more	than	fifty	years	after	they	reappeared	in	the	post-Civil	Rights	era.	
The	 survey	of	 international	projects	 suggests	 that	 the	common	 thread	 is	not	 found	 in	 the	direct	 comparability	of	armed	groups,	but	 in	 the	

























































were	 in	 the	 two	 models	 led	 directly	 by	 public	 policy	 rather	 than	 youth	 workers.	 The	 ‘Mechelen	 model’	 consciously	 reconceptualises	 the	






















context	 matters	 to	 each	 of	 them.	 That	 context	 includes	 location,	 the	 social	 status	 of	 the	 individuals,	 the	 people	 engaged	 both	 as	
practitioners	and	young	people	and	the	political	environment.	Similar	challenges	and	behaviours	within	a	different	social	and	political	








intervention	 and	 prevention	 approaches	were	 consciously	 targeted	 at	 the	 needs	 of	 the	 individuals	 at	 risk	 of	 ‘gang’	 involvement	 or	
‘radicalisation’.	
3. Youth	work	 is	 relationship-based,	and	 loses	 its	 capacity	 to	 influence	young	people	without	 trust:	 	A	common	critical	 theme	 in	 the	






of	 the	 sponsor	and	 the	host	 community.	 	 There	 is	 an	 inherent	difficulty	with	 top-down,	 state-driven	approaches	 to	grading	 ‘risk’,	 in	
which	the	state	defines	the	risk	and	applies	it	to	the	young	person	or	defines	‘need’	in	relation	to	state	criteria.	In	this	study,	this	was	
particularly	evident	 in	the	criticism	of	CHANNEL	 (O’Donnell,	2016;	Hill,	2019).	 In	Tackling	Paramilitarism,	the	sponsor	 is	the	state.	 	By	
engaging	 youth	 work,	 the	 state	 also	 engages	 the	 primacy	 of	 trust-building	 within	 youth	 work,	 and	 accepts	 clear	 distinctions	 with	
policing	and	security.		By	engaging	with	the	state,	youth	workers	also	accept	parameters,	including	commitments	to	safeguarding	and	
the	rule	of	law.		In	the	context	of	the	ambiguity	around	paramilitarism	and	the	role	of	the	state	in	Northern	Ireland,	however,	real	trust	
















This	 also	 includes	 signposting	 young	 people	 into	 professional	 support.	 	Most	 of	 the	 projects	 surveyed	 (including	 the	 two	 statutory	













• The	CIRV	project	 in	Glasgow,	 itself	borne	 from	the	 ‘focused	deterrence	strategy’	of	 the	Boston	Ceasefire	project,	exemplifies	 the	

































the	 Tackling	 Paramilitarism	 programme	 has	 its	 roots	 in	 public	 policy.	 However,	 unlike	 CHANNEL,	 and	 as	 outlined	 above,	 the	 state	 has	 a	
different	historical	relationship	with	communities,	organisations	and	people	in	Northern	Ireland,	shaped	in	particular	by	the	political	and	peace	
process	of	 the	1990s.	 	 In	broad	terms	anti-radicalisation	programmes	presume	that	 the	radical	element	 (whether	 Islamist	or	 far	 right)	 is	an	
abnormal	and	identifiable	violent	presence	which	does	not	represent	the	wider	community,	and	can	ultimately	be	isolated	from	it.		In	Northern	


















around	paramilitarism	 is	 no	 longer	 precise,	 and	may	 even	 add	 to	 confusion.	While	 ‘paramilitarism’	 and	 ‘paramilitaries’	 are	 still	 referred	 to	






























































‘paramilitarism’	 within	 their	 communities,	 they	 also	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	 experience	 of	 what	 this	 meant	 at	 local	 level	 varied	
enormously,	 even	 where	 the	 same	 organisation	 was	 involved.	 	 Loyalists	 largely	 equated	 their	 role	 as	 community	 activists	 with	
mainstream	Sinn	Fein-supporting	republicans,	and	indirectly	with	the	provisional	IRA	and	not	with	dissidents.		Most	republicans,on	the	






‘The	 issues	are	 similar	 in	 republican	 communities	with	 the	biggest	 issue	 the	dissidents	and	 the	multiple	 splinters	within	 that	




loyalist	 communities	 and	 exempting	 mainstream	 republicanism	 from	 change.	 Some	 loyalists	 express	 concern	 that	 community	
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groups	 are	 embedded,	 some	 community,	 political,	 cultural	 and	 criminal	 justice	 interests	may	 be,	 at	 best,	 ambivalent	 about	 actively	




and	 geography.	 Attitudes	 to	 paramilitarism	 shaped	 by	 very	 different	 local	 experience	 and	 by	 different	 generational	 experiences	
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inevitably	 shape	 attitudes	 to	 policy	 and	 to	 priorities	 for	 intervention.	 These	 differences	 impact	 directly	 on	 the	 language,	 content,	











tackling	 paramilitarism	 is	 seldom	 matched	 by	 action	 on	 the	 ground.	 	 Over	 a	 long	 period	 of	 time,	 the	 press	 has	 regularly	 carried	










widely	 disputed	 in	 the	 community.	 	 Where	 the	 links	 between	 paramilitary	 organisations	 and	 community	 development,	 political	
leadership	 and	 cultural	 organisations	 or	 on	 justice	 issues	 are	 hard	 to	 distinguish	 at	 local	 level,	 agencies	 are	 inevitably	 faced	with	 a	
dilemma.	 	 Thus	 numerous	 Interviewees	 commented	 on	 the	 ambiguous	 attitude	 to	 paramilitarism,	 armed	 groups	 and	 political	


















• Without	 exception,	 group	 domination	 of	 these	 areas	 is	 strongly	 associated	 with	 multiple	 deprivation	 and	 strict	 housing	
segregation	by	class,	politics	and	religion.	We	 found	a	consensus	 that	 ‘tackling	paramilitarism’	 is	 inextricably	 linked	 to	wider	






	‘This	 [is]	always	also	about	social	change	and	about	the	reduction	 in	alienation	and	violence	 in	social	 relationships.	Business	
and	people	need	to	be	part	of	the	pathways.	Currently,	this	is	a	niche	issue	–	for	people	already	in	multiple	deprivation.’	
	













policing,	have	formally	 identified	 ‘tackling’	paramilitarism	as	a	named	priority	 in	strategic	or	operational	planning,	 (ie	 intentional	and	
accountable	programmes	whose	success	is	measured	on	the	elimination	of	paramilitary	organisations	and	activity).		As	a	consequence,	
the	Tackling	Paramilitarism	programme	is	not	drawing	on	50	years	of	established	practice,	but	on	50	years	of	‘creative	adaptation’	to	




• During	 research	 for	 this	 project,	 many	 interviewees	 commented	 that	 the	 political	 environment	 had	 become	 more	 polarised,	 and	











‘What	has	changed?	I	would	say	 look	at	the	city,	the	 infrastructure,	the	 investment.	People	see	certain	bits	of	that.	But	what	















































This	 pattern	 of	 ambivalence	 and	 ambiguity	 was	 reflected	 throughout	 our	 interviews.	 	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 interviewees	 emphasised	 that	













	‘If	we	were	 to	 condemn	 them,	 they	would	 stop	 talking	 to	 us.	When	 I	worked	 on	 the	 X	 interface,	we	 couldn’t	 say	 anything	
























‘Communities	 are	 still	 defined	 by	 crime.	 Community	 identity	 is	 tied	 up	 with	 heroic	 resistance,	 and	 the	 paramilitaries	 are	
associated	with	this.	Alternative	identity	formation.	Paramilitaries	stand	up	for	me	as	a	lost	person.’	
Even	 apparently	 straightforward	 descriptions	 of	 paramilitaries	 as	 criminals	 and	drug	 dealers	were	 qualified	 by	 some	 interviewees.	 In	 some	
areas,	paramilitaries	seem	to	see	their	role	as	protecting	the	community	from	drugs	and	maintaining	order	against	the	potential	for	criminal	










paramilitaries	 are	 still	 perpetuating	 the	 messenger.	 We	 needed	 a	 suitability	 panel	 [that	 existed	 in	 restorative	 justice]	 or	
something	like	it.	The	thing	about	ex-prisoners	is	that	you	can’t	get	taxi	licences	but	you	can	run	the	country.’	
The	‘legitimacy’	or	paramilitarism	is	thus	a	highly	volatile	social	variable	and	may	change	quickly	depending	on	the	specific	issue	in	dispute,	the	
immediate	 political	 environment	 and	 local	 perceptions	 of	 the	 alternatives.	 This	 volatility	 makes	 it	 hard	 for	 youth	 workers	 to	 develop	 a	








political	 ideology	 and	 identity,	 community	 organisation,	 informal	 community	 power	 structures	 including	 the	 local	 formal	 and	 informal	
economy,	 criminal	 justice	 and	welfare	 issues.	 At	 this	 stage	 of	 development,	 external	 partners	 relate	 on	 a	 daily	 basis	 to	 ‘paramilitaries’	 or	



































This	was	 combined	with	 the	 attraction	 of	 belonging	 to	 a	 ‘gang’	 identified	 in	 the	 previous	 section	 on	models	 of	 practice	 outside	 Northern	
Ireland:	
‘The	group	in	this	area	are	young	people	searching	for	a	sense	of	identity/security/belonging	to	feel	safe.	They	identify	with	a	
group	 to	 have	 protection.	 The	 other	 element	 is	 the	 rush,	 the	 adrenaline.	 The	 young	men	don’t	 understand	 the	 fear	 and	 the	






such	 that	 even	 where	 young	 people	 consciously	 separate	 from	 paramilitaries,	 they	 end	 up	 participating	 within	 the	 sphere	 of	 action	 of	
paramilitary	groups:	










and	 republican	 areas	 and	were	 critical	 of	 the	 approach	 of	 policing	 at-risk	 young	 people,	which	 they	 felt	was	 often	 counterproductive,	 and	
created	impediments	to	their	own	ability	to	work	with	police:	
‘Currently,	the	practice	is	personality-based	and	there	is	no	real	institutional	contract.	Also,	the	relationship	is	with	constables	
















the	 explicit	 or	 primary	 aim	 of	 preventing	 young	 people	 from	 joining	 local	 armed	 groups	 or	 paramilitary	 organisations,	 or	 with	 an	 explicit	










































‘What	we	were	 trying	 to	 stop	 [was]	people	being	brutalised…	Our	primary	purpose	 then	was	de-escalating	 situational	 crisis,	





















































issues	–	that’s	why	we	got	 into	this	profession	–	and	 if	 they	do	end	up	within	a	paramilitary	group	 it	 is	not	the	failure	of	the	
youth	worker.	There	are	so	many	variables	 that	 lead	 to	 that	 scenario.	You	can	never	write	 someone	off	but,	 instead,	always	
leave	the	door	open.’	
These	workers	were	largely	of	the	view	that	a	values-led	approach	had	always	been	central	to	the	task	of	youth	work	in	communities:	










‘They	are	not	 training	 it	 in	here	 [Ulster	University].	 I	am	fighting	 to	have	 ‘circle	of	courage’	and	 ‘good	relations’	back	on	 the	
degree.	There	is	no	trauma-informed	practice	on	the	course.’	
This	 view	 cannot,	 however,	 be	 regarded	 as	 an	 established	 consensus	within	 youth	work.	 For	 some,	 the	 political	 nature	 of	 armed	 struggle	




























































































Beyond	 short-term	diversion,	 a	number	of	 youth	workers	pointed	 to	persistent	presentation	of	alternatives	 such	as	employment,	 as	a	 vital	
element	in	any	process	of	change:	





part	 of	 last	 year”.	 Not	 one	 of	 them	 has	 been	 arrested	 this	 year.	We	 got	 the	 right	 people	 in	 –	 they	 had	 to	 go	 through	 an	
application	process	to	reinforce	achievement.	They	had	an	induction	and	training	–	induction,	child	protection,	CRED.	This	year,	
nobody	will	be	out	on	bonfire	night.’		































It	 therefore	 seems	 likely	 that	 the	 specific	 contribution	of	 youth	work	 to	any	programme	 related	 to	armed	groups	may	 lie	 in	 its	 capacity	 to	


































The	themes	of	persistence	and	consistency	were	also	common	among	all	 the	professionals	 interviewed.	 In	 relation	 to	young	people	at	 risk,	
workers	accepted	that	 inconsistency	and	unreliability	were	expected	behaviours	and	that	the	 job	of	youth	workers	was	to	offer	a	pro-social	
model	 that	 could	 challenge	 this	 for	 young	 people.	 It	 also	 echoed	 the	 themes	 of	 ‘relentless	 follow-up’	 evident	 in	 some	of	 the	 ‘gang’-based	
projects	in	the	US,	surveyed	earlier:	
	
































1. A	 revision	 of	 the	 understanding	 of	 ‘risk’	 in	 youth	work	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘at	 risk’	 is	 focused	 away	 from	 generic	 socio-









We	are	only	talking	seven	to	ten	kids	 [in	my	area].	But	they	are	the	most	 fragile,	broken	kids	you	have	ever	met	 in	your	 life.	
Nobody	wants	to	help	them,	but	nobody	wants	to	walk	with	them.’	
	
2. A	 formal	 professional	 recognition	 of	 the	 damage	 that	 violence	 does	 to	 young	 people,	 both	 through	 trauma	 as	 victims	 and	 in	









































the	dark	 side	of	 social	 capital.	The	ambers	 take	more	work	 than	 the	greens.	For	 the	 reds,	we	can’t	do	 that	with	youth	work	














































that	 is	 simply	 the	 way	 things	 are	 –	 you	 see	 everything	 as	 normative	 –	 so	 reflective	 practice	 is	 crucial.	 But…	 you	 also	 need	 a	 good	
challenge	when	doing	reflective	work	–	need	to	be	questioned	about	why	we	do	the	things	we	do.’	
There	was,	 therefore,	 a	 broad	 agreement	 that	 the	 generation	 of	 trust	 towards	 the	 goal	 of	 tackling	 paramilitarism	 in	 youth	work	 required	
attention	 to	active	 relationship-building	between	a	number	of	key	stakeholders	and	partners.	 In	every	case,	 these	 included	maintaining	 the	






































































































































In	 general,	 youth	workers	 in	 this	 research	 agreed	 that	 the	 only	meaningful	 level	 of	measurement	was	 in	 changed	 life	 prospects	 for	 young	












Within	 this	 broad	 framework,	 youth	workers	 accepted	 that	 indicative	 changes	were	 also	 important	 as	milestones	 in	 the	 shorter	 term.	 This	
required	 a	 degree	 of	 qualitative	 assessment,	 including	 stories	 of	 potential,	 which	 could	 act	 as	 exemplars	 for	 future	 work,	 especially	 in	 a	
developing	new	area	of	work.	A	number	of	examples	were	offered:	






























solving	political	 disputes,	 that	 the	 rule	of	 law	 should	 apply	 everywhere	 and	 that	 paramilitary	 groups	 should	disband.	 In	 theory,	 this	
















Consistent	 with	 UN	 Security	 Council	 Resolution	 2250,	 the	 contribution	 of	 youth	 work	 is	 a	 commitment	 to	 young	 people	 and	 their	
participation	and	a	refusal	to	engage	in	‘moral	panic’,	while	at	the	same	time	recognising	that	violence	and	conflict	shapes	and	distorts	





























sources	 of	 protection	 and	 finance.	 	 Anyone	 charged	 professionally	 with	 tackling	 paramilitarism	 at	 local	 level	 without	
unambiguous	support	is	perceived	to	be	immediately	at	risk.		This	has	not	substantially	changed	since	1998;	




• Funders	 appear	 to	 treat	 tackling	 paramilitarism	 as	 a	 short-term	 delivery	 target	 rather	 than	 a	 major	 culture-change	 project	
requiring	the	development	of	cultures	of	trust,	collaboration,	co-design	and	co-delivery.	There	 is	a	need	to	move	away	from	
short-term	 ‘delivery’	models,	 to	one	which	measures	 long-term	and	 sustainable	 changes	 in	 culture,	 reflected	 in	 the	 lives	of	
young	people;	
• There	 are	 few	 opportunities	 for	 honest	 dialogue	 about	 challenges,	 opportunities	 and	 risks	 on	 these	 themes	 between	 young	




d. Change	will	 depend	 on	 addressing	 the	 identified	 challenges	 and	 embedding	 the	 values	 and	 practice	 of	 supporting	 young	 people	 to	
















opportunities	 for	 a	 triage	 system,	perhaps	 including	 community	mental	health	 services,	 to	enable	appropriate	 response	 to	 issues	of	
young	people	 and	 violence	 in	 the	 community.	 The	 central	 importance	 of	 pastoral	 care	 and	mental	 health	 support	was	 a	 consistent	
theme	of	this	research.		The	START	programme	should	be	directly	connected	to	mental	health	services,	to	enable	fast	access	to	mental	
health	acute	services	at	the	point	of	vulnerability.			
3. Addressing	Paramilitarism	and	 its	 impact	on	young	people	 remains	an	undeveloped	area	of	youth	work	practice.	 	The	Youth	Service	
could	establish	clear	opportunities	 for	 reflective	 learning	and	critical	 reflective	practice	 to	underpin	 the	development	of	professional	
standards.	Such	a	process	might	consider	whether	tackling	paramilitarism	and	related	issues	of	armed	group	violence	requires	specialist	
skills	or	becomes	part	of	generic	youth	work	in	Northern	Ireland.		
4. Youth	work	 practice,	 professional	 standards	 and	 training	 should	 be	 developed	 to	 ensure	 that	 tackling	 paramilitarism	 	 and	 all	 other	
programmes	are	governed	by	international	standards	of	working	with	young	people	(as	articulated	in	‘The	Missing	Piece’(2018));		This	
includes	a	formal	commitment	to:	











behaviour	 and	 influences.	 The	 Tackling	 Paramilitarism	 programme	 should	 ensure	 that	 these	 pathways	 are	 available	 and	
integrated	with	broader	youth	work	approaches.	
5. Youth	work	programmes	are	committed	to	working	towards	reducing	exposure	to	trauma,	and	risk	of	any	further	harm	to	participants	
within	 traumatised	 communities.	 	 Youth	 work	 agencies	 should	 continue	 to	 explore	 the	 potential	 of	 Restorative	 Practices,	 Trauma-
informed	approaches	 to	practice,	 and	 the	potential	 for	public	health	 approaches	 to	 violence	 reduction	 to	enhance	 youth	work,	 and	
integrate	learning	into	professional	training	and	development.			
6. One	 of	 the	 most	 important	 concepts	 emerging	 from	 this	 research	 was	 ‘relentless	 outreach’	 to	 young	 people	 at	 risk.	 There	 was	
widespread	support	among	workers	for	diverting	resources	to	those	most	at	risk.		While	this	concept	was	seen	as	vital	in	establishing	
commitment	 to	 some	 of	 the	 most	 marginalised,	 it	 was	 also	 recognised	 that	 successful	 outreach	 was	 emotionally	 and	 physically	
challenging	for	workers.	 	To	enable	this,	 the	Youth	service	should	establish	clear	mechanisms	to	support	workers	 in	this	difficult	and	














social	 development	 and	 trauma-informed	approaches	 are	necessarily	 distinct	 from	enforcement-based	approaches,	 through	policing	
and	criminal	justice	on	the	other.		Youth	work	programmes	can	only	contribute	to	the	overall	programme	if	youth	participation	remains		
voluntary	 rather	 than	mandatory.	 The	ways	 in	which	each	 can	and	 should	 contribute	 to	 the	outcome	of	 the	Tackling	Paramilitarism	
programme	is	distinctive,	and	it	wold	be	helpful	if	the	expectations	of	how	each	method	is	applied	and	complements	each	other	could	
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